Introduction
In recent years, total health expenditure in Slovenia has grown, reaching 9.3 per cent of GDP in 2009 (WHO 2011 . This trend is expected to continue in the future as Slovenia's population is ageing, complex chronic illnesses are becoming more common, and patient expectations are rising; factors that drive up the demand for health services. This growing demand, however, is becoming more difficult to meet with a health insurance system based on contributions from the working population. Financial constraints are especially acute in the current economic crisis, which has been followed by increasing unemployment and efforts to cut down government spending. In some countries, such as the United States, expenditure on nearly all medical goods and services has slowed to increase or declined as a result of the economic crisis, with the slowest rise in national health expenditure in the United States in 50 years (Pugh 2011) .
This challenging demographic and fiscal context was one of the reasons why the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia explored ways of improving access to health services, both in terms of financing and the way health service provision is organized. Accessibility was defined as ensuring access to high-quality health services, using new health care technologies with proven clinical and cost effectiveness, and meeting the needs of the population.
Yet the needs of the population are difficult to establish, in particular when considering what might be unreasonable demands from both the population and health care providers for using the latest (and potentially very expensive) medical technologies. No country is able to afford all novelties; however, those that are cost-effective and proven to be clinically effective and safe can bring better health to the population in the long term and consequently savings to the health system. As there is no universally accepted methodology of how to define real health needs, we used a proxy measure in the form of health care procedures conducted in previous years and added the number of patients on waiting lists for these procedures. The aim was to ensure as much accessibility as possible to required health services within the confines of the national health care budget. One of the innovative approaches adopted in 2009 to achieve this aim was the introduction of a national tender for prospective programmes.
The idea of the national tender
The work that won Leonid Hurwicz the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics (shared with Eric Masskin and Roger Myerson) was concerned with the economic theory of mechanism design, a specialized field of game theory (Wikipedia 2011). This brilliant economic theory explores the art and science of designing rules of a game in order to achieve specific outcomes in circumstances where each participant is guided by selfinterest. For this purpose, the designer needs to set up a structure in which each player has an incentive to behave as the designer intends, so that the game will result in the desired outcome.
Mechanism designers commonly try to achieve the following basic outcomes: truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance, and social welfare. In the case of the national tender in Slovenia, for example, each provider would behave rationally in trying to sell services as expensively as possible. However, this would neither be optimal for patients (social welfare) nor for the HIIS (budget balance).
In many situations it is impossible to achieve optimal results for all four outcomes simultaneously, particularly in markets where buyers can also be sellers. Much research in mechanism design is therefore concerned with trade-offs between these outcomes. Other desirable outcomes include fairness (minimizing variance between participants' utilities), maximizing the auction holder's revenue, and Pareto efficiency. More advanced mechanisms sometimes attempt to prevent harmful coalitions of players (The Economist 2007).
Leonid Hurwicz contributed the idea of compatibility between incentives. He argued that in order to get as close as possible to the most efficient economic outcomes, it is necessary to design a mechanism in which everyone does best for themselves. This can be achieved by sharing information truthfully (price transparency). Otherwise, some people could do better than others by not sharing information or lying (The Economist 2007).
